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THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS LAND IS MY LAND?
WHY THE COBELL SETTLEMENT WILL NOT RESOLVE
INDIAN LAND FRACTIONATION
Jered T. Davidson*
I. Introduction
Land ownership is generally regarded as the pinnacle of success and
stability in regard to financial security. It has provided class structure,
facilitated the development of countries, and furthered the transfer of wealth
across generations. The first peoples to inhabit the United States, however,
maintained a very different view of property. Massasoit said,
What is this you call property? It cannot be the earth, for the land
is our mother, nourishing all her children, beasts, birds, fish and all
men. The woods, the streams, everything on it belongs to
everybody and is for the use of all. How can one man say it
belongs only to him?'
This communal view of property is one of tradition in Native American
culture,' but the Indians nonetheless hold "private" property as well.3
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Special thanks and
sincere gratitude to Professor Katheleen Guzman for encouragement, advice, and critique while
developing this comment, and for propelling me to reach beyond my boundaries. Much
appreciation and accolades to Professor Owen Anderson for encouraging me to create novel
solutions and to apply my abilities to furthering the legal community. Special recognition
should also be paid to my family, without whom I would not be in the position I am today.
1. Native American Quotes About Land Ownership, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
http://www.adl.org/education/curriculumconnections/NA Quotes.asp (last visited Apr. 25,
2011).
2. See Mary Lynn Murphy, Note, Assessing NAGPRA: An Analysis ofits Success from a
Historical Perspective, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 499, 502 (2001) ("[E]arly American property
law, which emphasized private property ownership, ignored Native American concepts of
communal property ownership.").
3. Terry L. Anderson, Property Rights Among Native Americans, FREEMAN, Feb. 1997,
available athttp://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/property-rights-among-native-americans/
("While some ownership was completely or almost completely communal, other ownership was
more like today's fee simple."); Kenneth H. Bobroff, RetellingAllotment: Indian PropertyRights
and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559, 1599 (2001) ("Tribal property
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Although the taking of individuals' private property for personal gain is
generally regarded as a crime, the federal government has been doing so for
over two hundred years4 through the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment'
and its subsequent jurisprudence. Native Americans have suffered similar
injustices with continuing acquiescence by the Supreme Court.6
Most citizens would be outraged by the taking of land from private
citizens, but "the federal government has enacted legislation and policies that
have consistently taken both tribally held, and even individually held, land
away from Native Americans" through removal, allotment, and escheat.'
Once considered a great program for assimilation, the "trust" theory of Indian
rights have varied across time, geography, cultures, and resources. Agricultural cultures have had
the most extensive private property systems."); see also Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an
Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IowA L. REv. 595, 614-15
(2000) ("To argue, however, that the ILCA effected no taking because no private property existed
and, therefore, no one owned it works in only the most sterile sense. Legal theory divorces the
term 'property' from the item itself to instead describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item.
'Property' thus means things one can do with Blackacre (entitlements) including its use,
possession and consumption, as well as enjoying its fruits, the ability to exclude others from its
use, and the ability to transfer it. Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights
in one person who then totes the full 'bundle of sticks,' one may properly speak of 'owning' a
lone entitlement or stick, such as an option, right of first refusal, easement, restrictive covenant,
or developmental right. Legally, the right itselfis the property. Thus, there is property at stake
superior, and perhaps even anterior, to ownership of Blackacre per se: the right to transfer it, in
whole or in part, during life or at death. Abolishing rights of descent and devise therefore
abolishes property, however conceptual that might seem. Whether that abolition constitutes a
taking is a different inquiry.").
4. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) ("It may well be doubted
whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the
legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation. To the
legislature all legislative power is granted; but the question, whether the act of transferring the
property of an individual to the public, be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy
of serious reflection."); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (stating that the
restrictions in the Bill of Rights, specifically the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, are
limits on the federal government and not the states); Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporated to
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Kristina L. McCulley, Comment, The American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004:
The Death of Fractionation or Individual Native American Property Interests and Tribal
Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 401, 401 (2005-2006) ("Native Americans have long known
the sting of injustice in having their property rights stripped away by the federal government
with the approving sanction of the Supreme Court.").
7. Id at 402.
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protection soon proved to be economic disaster.' The assimilationist policies
essentially stripped Native Americans of the right to alienate their land,
creating a massive web of fractionation that has now rendered the allotted
lands virtually worthless.'
In 1996, Eloise Cobell filed suit on behalf of over three hundred thousand
Individual Indian Money (H1M) account holders to provide a proper
accounting for all of the monies held in trust for individual Indians by the
federal government."o Some prior and subsequent policies of the federal
government attempted to resolve the accounting issues and to achieve the
reorganization of the fractionated lands, hoping to restore their value to the
landholders."
The Cobell settlement highlights that problems with fractionation are still
very much alive. A lump-sum compensation scheme is unworkable. To
address the issues raised in the Cobell litigation, as well as to prevent further
fractionation, Indian tribes must take a stance for fulfillment of trust
responsibilities and more power in governance. A single, lump-sum payment
is unworkable because truly compensating the Indians for their losses would
essentially bankrupt the United States.12 The Indian tribes and federal
government must be willing to adopt new legislation that seeks to resolve
the land tenure problem, or to use other essential government powers such as
eminent domain to correct land fractionation, restoring economic value to the
8. Guzman, supra note 3, at 654 ("Quite apart from Congress's role in creating
fractionation is its alleged role in perpetuating the economic hardships plaguing allotments and
other trust property.").
9. Id. at 598 ("Fractionation [] renders allotment development or other economically
productive use monumentally elusive, and propels investors into a 'Kafkaesque quagmire' of
negotiation and statutory and regulatory compliance.") (citation omitted).
10. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that the Secretary of the
Interior had a duty to render an accurate accounting of all funds held in IIM trust and to create
written plans for record retention and staffing, and that delay in discharging such duties
constituted breach of trust).
11. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006)); Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-458, 96 Stat.
2515 (1983) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2210 (2006)); American Indian Trust
Fund Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4061 (2006)); American Indian Probate Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
108-374, 118 Stat. 1773 (2004).
12. According to the Department of the Interior, the federal government currently maintains
fifty-six million acres of trust land. Press Release, Office of the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Secretary Salazar, Attorney General Holder Announce Settlement of Cobell Lawsuit
on Indian Trust Management (Dec. 8, 2009) available at http://www.doi.gov/ost/cobell/
FINAL_12-08-09_Cobell releaseas revised_12-7PMFINAL.pdf.
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fractionated lands. These solutions are not likely to grant full compensation
to all fractional interest holders, but they nonetheless offer more than the
alternatives undertaken thus far.
This comment analyzes the potential impact of the Cobell v. Salazar Class
Action Settlement Agreement of 2009" on the issue of fractionation of Indian
lands. To prevent further fractionation of land and allow the merger of
fractionated interests, this comment proposes alternative measures that the
federal government should implement to enable greater control of property
currently held in IIM accounts. Part II provides a brief history of early Indian
land policy, from the discovery doctrine to allotment. Part III introduces the
problem of fractionation, noting the continuing struggles encountered by IIM
holders and the federal government. Part IV discusses the complex Cobell
framework, including the goals of the litigation, the importance of a historical
accounting, and the resultant agreed-upon settlement conditions. Part V
proposes a series of approaches to properly combat the land fractionation
problem, offering ideas to greater enhance tribal and individual control of
allotted lands. It analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each, and
concludes that a collaborative approach and active participation by the federal
government, Indian tribes, and tribal members is needed to facilitate the end
to one of America's most blatantly inadequate policies.
I. A Trusting Relationship?
In 1823, the United States Supreme Court began laying the foundation
for Indian land policy. It was in that year that the Court issued its opinion
in Johnson v. M'Intosh.14 The opinion asserted the United States' control
of Indian lands by virtue of Great Britain's discovery, vesting exclusive
title to those lands in the federal government, limited only by the Indians'
right of occupancy."s Yet, the Court further held that those rights could
be extinguished by the federal government by either purchase or conquest."
This decision "constructed the current foundation of federal Indian land
13. See INDIAN TRUST SETrLEMENT, http://cobellsettlement.com (last visited Apr. 25,2011)
("On December 21, 2010, The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
preliminary approval to the [Cobell v. Salazar Class Action] Settlement. On December 8, 2010,
President Obama signed legislation approving the Settlement and authorizing $3.4 billion in
funds.").
14. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
15. Id at 584-85.
16. Id. at 587.
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policy by swiftly sweeping Indian land 'ownership' into the oddly-hybrid
form it retains today: tribal use at federal sufferance."
"Although Indian removal is generally associated with the 1830 act of
Congress, the process was already beginning in the late 1700s" when Indians
were being pushed from lands along the East Coast." "Under the provisions
of the [Indian Removal Act of 1830], the Choctaws, the Chickasaws,
Cherokees, Creeks, and ultimately the Seminoles . . . moved to Indian
Territory (what is now the state of Oklahoma)."" The following year, the
trust relationship first appeared with the pronouncement in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia2 0 that tribes are "domestic dependent nation[s]" with a relationship
to the federal government that resembles a "ward to his guardian."2' Less
than one year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,22 the Court reaffirmed the
Cherokee tribe's right to self-govemance by preventing Georgia from
exercising its laws within the borders of the Cherokee Nation." Yet, because
of the treaties between the Nation and the federal government, the Nation was
to remain "under the protection of the United States."24
Perhaps the greatest protection recognized under the Cherokee cases is the
fiduciary duty owed to Native Americans regarding land ownership, in which
the "Indians held their land and property as beneficiaries, subject to the
control of the United States acting as trustee." 25 This protection of land
persevered until the allotment era occasioned a temporary interlude.
17. Guzman, supra note 3, at 602-03.
18. Clara Sue Kidwell, The Effects ofRemoval on American Indian Tribes, NAT'LHUMAN.
CENTER, http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntecoindian/essays/indianremovalc.
htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
19. Id.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
21. Id. at 17.
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. Id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter.").
24. Id. at 561-62.
25. McCulley, supra note 6, at 404.
No. 2] 579
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Allotment began in 1887 with the passage of the General Allotment Act,
also known as the Dawes Act, bearing the name of its author.26 The Act
authorized the President to grant allotments, 27 which were typically one-
hundred-and-sixty-acre parcels of Indian reservation land, to the individual
Indians.28 When all Indians had received an allotted parcel, "the remaining
surplus lands were . . . opened to [white] settlement."" The Dawes Act
"privatized reservations by removing the land from tribal ownership and
control," and then "surveyed, sectioned, and parceled land to individual tribal
members in trust."" While federal Indian policy was initially based on "the
separation of tribes and citizens,"" in the 1880s, the idea of peacekeeping
through separation gave way to the ultimate goal of assimilation, where
Native peoples were to become agrarian, Christian, and citizens. 2 The
allotment policy was premised on the idea that "[t]he primary agent of
civilization and citizenship was to be private land ownership."" With these
elements in place, the Indians could be purged of their cultural inhibitions,
ultimately leading to "legal cultural genocide." 34
The Dawes Act further facilitated acculturation by allowing "the federal
government . .. to retain legal title and transfer[] mere beneficial or equitable
title to each allottee, who was to receive a standard fee patent after 25 years.
26. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § § 331-334, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2006)); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1, 9 & n.32 (1995).
27. See Royster, supra note 26, at 10 n.34 ("The exact size of allotments varied over time.
As originally enacted, the General Allotment Act varied the size of the allotment by the status
of the individual. Each head of family received 160 acres; single adults received 80 acres; and
orphans and other single persons received even less.").
28. McCulley, supra note 6, at 407.
29. Royster, supra note 26, at 9 & n.33.
30. Guzman, supra note 3, at 604.
31. Royster, supra note 26, at 7.
32. Id. at 9 ("[Aldvocates of the policy believed that individual ownership of property
would turn the Indians from a savage, primitive, tribal way of life to a settled, agrarian, and
civilized one."); Guzman, supra note 3, at 597 ("In 1887, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act to privatize Indian reservations and advance the assimilationist sentiment of the
day. The Act divested land from tribes to their members, each of whom received a tract of land
on a wing and a prayer: become an autonomous Christian agrarian.").
33. Royster, supra note 26, at 9.
34. Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the
Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713, 721 (1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss2/5
During the trust period, all conveyances . . . were prohibited" absent the
express "approval of the Secretary of the Interior."3 5 This complete restraint
on alienation deprived Indians of freely transferring their interests or making
their land economically productive, 3 rendering them in the classification of
the "landed poor.",3  But the problem did not end there. The Dawes Act also
prevented allottees from transferring their allotments by will at death, leaving
distribution up to state intestacy law, which divided small parcels among
multiple interest holders, fractionating the interests into unusable parcels.
III. The Fractionation Problem and the Failure ofRedress
A. The Evolution ofFractionation
The initial problem with the Dawes Act is that it required the federal
government to hold land in trust, denying alienability and preventing
individual Indians from controlling their lands. 39 After the expiration of the
trust period of twenty-five years, however, the individual Indian would
receive a patent40 in fee,4 1 free from any other holdings and completely
alienable.4 2 "The twenty-five year trust period [soon] came under attack"
from supporters of assimilation, who rallied Congress to pass the Burke Act
in 1906,43 authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue early patents.'
The passage of the Burke Act resulted in a huge influx of often premature
35. Id.
36. McCulley, supra note 6, at 405.
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 957 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009) (defining land-
poor as one "owning a substantial amount of unprofitable or encumbered land, but lacking the
money to improve or maintain the land or to pay the charges due on it").
38. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Comment, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment,
Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 729, 738.
39. Id.
40. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 1234 (defining patent as a "governmental
grant of right, privilege, or authority").
41. Id. at 690 (defining a fee as "a heritable interest in land").
42. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006).
43. Royster, supra note 26, at 10.
44. Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(2006)) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior, in his discretion, to issue a patent in fee
simple to an allottee if they are deemed "competent and capable of managing his or her affairs,"
and the result of which removed "all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said
land").
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patent grants, which came from the adoption of "competency commissions"
that would roam Indian Country looking to issue early patents.45
Between the "expiration of the trusts and premature patents[,] thousands
of patents in fee were issued." 6  These lands, once patented, could be
alienated and encumbered, and Indian owners fell subject to fraudulent sales
and repossessions for failure to pay liens.47 Before the expiration of the
allotment era, nearly twenty-seven million acres had fallen out of Indian
hands, and another sixty million acres were lost through sales of "surplus"
lands to non-Indians.48 In the end, "[u]nless its covert purpose was to force
precipitous declines in Indian-held acreage, allotment failed."49
But the loss of land was only the beginning. Those that died within the
twenty-five-year trust period were not allowed to devise their property or
distribute their allotments according to their personal wishes.50  "Thus,
allotment required sharing of land among an ever-increasing number of heirs,
as the original allottees died, and left no means for flexible management, sale,
or consolidation at any point in the process. ... [which] practically mandated
the start of fractionation."51
The complete and utter failure of the allotment policy facilitated the
continued fractionation problems of today. Interests have become so small
that it is virtually impossible for any one of the landholders to turn it into
something economically valuable.52 For example, consider the famous case
of Tract 1305 of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux tribe referenced in Hodel v.
Irving:
Tract 1305 [of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse reservation]
is 40 acres and produces $1,080 dollars in income annually. It is
valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive
less than $.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom receive less
45. Royster, supra note 26, at 11-12.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Guzman, supra note 3, at 605.
50. Shoemaker, supra note 38, at 738.
51. Id.
52. McCulley, supra note 6, at 408 ("The miserable failure ofthe allotment process, set into
motion by the Dawes Act, created this large problem of fractionation, where increasingly
multiple co-owners share the already small parcels of land to the extent that it marginalizes their
interests to the point of nearly negating any feasible economic or practical use of the land.").
582 [Vol. 35
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than $1. The largest interest holder receives $82.85 annually. The
common denominator used to compute fractional interests in the
property is 3,394,923,840,000. The smallest heir receives $.01
every 177 years. If the tract were sold (assuming the 439 owners
could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled
to $.000418. The administrative costs of handling this tract are
estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. 3
"In 2003, this same tract produced $2,000 in income annually and was valued
at $22,000.",4 The number of owners has increased to 505 and "the smallest
heir would now be entitled to $.00001824," while the administrative costs per
year ballooned to $42,800." Even a simpler case would show the
inefficiencies of allotment and the extreme fractionation of land that has
occurred. Today, "many allotments exceed several hundred owners," with
common denominators reaching the trillions.
The fundamental problem is that now these "allotments may have tens or
hundreds of owners, and many of the owners are so distantly related that they
do not know each other, live in distant states, and are members of different
tribes."" The land has become economically worthless. The fractionalized
interest holders have basically become this generation's "landed poor"
because they are unable to acquire "credit, reliable returns on investment and
improvements, and the potential for wealth accumulation," while
continuously being "constructive[ly] dispossess[ed] despite maintenance of
record title."" Moreover, obtaining unanimous agreement for sale or leasing
is virtually impossible. If the owners do not know each other - much less
know how many other holders there are - they cannot seek to turn the land
into an economically productive parcel."
53. Guzman, supra note 3, at 610 (quoting Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987))
(alteration in original).
54. OFFICE OF THE SPECIALTRUSTEE, U.S.DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RESTORING TRUST: THE
REFORMATION OF INDIAN TRUST MANAGEMENT 5 (2007), [hereinafter RESTORING TRUST],
available at http://www.doi.gov/ost/congressional/restoringtrust.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Guzman, supra note 3, at 598.
57. John C. Sledd, Events Leading to the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004,
at 3 (Apr. 12,2007) (Montana State University Symposium), available at http://www.montana.
edulindianland/symposium/pdf/eventsleadingtoAlPRA.pdf.
58. Shoemaker, supra note 38, at 749.
59. See Guzman, supra note 3, at 607-08 ("Unlike the routine cotenancy where any
concurrent owner may lease, sell, or mortgage a fractional interest without procuring approval
from the other owners, leasing an allotment ordinarily requires unanimous consent by all
583No. 2]
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One way to attempt to make economic use of fractionated land is to seek
federal approval for leases, but this practice is limited by requiring approval
of a pre-designated number of owners.o The reality is that the consequences
of one failed policy continue to haunt allottees and the federal government
alike. We remain in a state where fractionated interests continue to grow at
an unprecedented pace.
B. Attempted Salvation from Fractionation
Problems attendant to allotment began appearing almost immediately after
the passage of the Dawes Act.6' Neither the assimilationists nor the tribes and
tribal members were happy with the policies or the amount of corruption
emerging within the system.62
The 1920s saw a drastic change in federal policy regarding allotments. The
"forced-fee and other premature patents were officially abandoned," and, by
interest holders. This arrangement creates enormous difficulties where lost or simply
recalcitrant cotenants exist.").
60. 25 U.S.C. § 2218 (a), (b)(1) (2006) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Secretary may approve any lease or agreement that affects individually owned allotted land or
any other land held in trust or restricted status by the Secretary on behalf of an Indian, if - (A)
the owners of not less than the applicable percentage (determined under subsection (b) of this
section) of the undivided interest in the allotted land that is covered by the lease or agreement
consent in writing to the lease or agreement; and (B) the Secretary determines that approving
the lease or agreement is in the best interest of the owners of the undivided interest in the
allotted land.. . . The applicable percentage referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section shall
be determined as follows: (A) If there are 5 or fewer owners of the undivided interest in the
allotted land, the applicable percentage shall be 90 percent. (B) If there are more than 5 such
owners, but fewer than II such owners, the applicable percentage shall be 80 percent. (C) If
there are more than 10 such owners, but fewer than 20 such owners, the applicable percentage
shall be 60 percent. (D) If there are 20 or more such owners, the applicable percentage shall be
a majority of the interests in the allotted land.").
61. See INTERTRIBAL MONITORING Ass'N ON INDIAN TRUST FUNDS, REPORT ON
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIVIDUALS ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF
FRACTIONED OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN ALLOTTED INDIAN LANDS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ADDRESSING FRACTIONATION 7 (2009) available at http://www.itmatrustfunds.org/documents/
Fractionated%20Land%20Initiative/FY09/09January/2009Jan,%20ITMA%20Fractionation
%20Report%20&%20Recommendations.pdf.
62. See Royster, supra note 26, at 16 ("The destructive effects of the allotment policy
documented in the Meriam Report - effects on the economic, social, and physical well-being
of the tribes - generated sympathy and popular support for a change in the federal approach.").
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the 1930s, the issuance of patents was down more than fifty percent. Land
loss, however, was still ravaging Indian Country.'
Soon thereafter, the Department of the Interior (DOI) began to look for
ways to shore up the Indian land problem. The ultimate result was the 1928
publishing of the Meriam Report, a nine-hundred-page document recounting
the plight of Native Americans, giving great detail on the effects of
fractionation.65 The report, which was independent from the government,
examined the "economic, social, cultural, and physical well-being of the
tribes."" While the Meriam Report is generally considered the catalyst for
shifting sentiment in regard to Indian land policy, the 1933 appointment of
John Collier as Secretary of the Interior was equally momentous.
1. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
"Within four months of taking office, Collier effectively put an end to
allotment and the practice of issuing fee patents by directing the
superintendents not to submit either certificates of competency or fee
patents."6  Collier's work was reaffirmed the following year when Congress
enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 68 The IRA provided
that no lands "shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian,"6 extended the trust
63. Id. at 15.
64. See id. at 13 ("Despite the devastating effect of fee patents, the 27 million patented
acres lost to non-Indians represented only about one-third of the tribal losses during the
allotment era. More than twice as much land - some 60 million acres - was lost under the
surplus lands program.").
65. INST. FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Lewis
Meriam ed., 1928).
66. Royster, supra note 26, at 16.
67. Id.
68. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-495 (2006)).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 461. Interestingly, the Act did nothing to address the allotments of the
previous Dawes time period, but merely prevented the future allotment of lands that were held
on behalf of Indians. Guzman, supra note 3, at 606 ("While remedial, the Indian
Reorganization Act did little to halt the steady spread of land base erosion, as it neither reversed
existing allotments by returning them to the tribe nor invalidated completed transactions to
Anglo-American takers. It additionally proved ineffectual against the fractionation of existing
allotments.").
No. 2] 585
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period for the original allotments,70 "authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to restore any remaining surplus lands to tribal ownership,"" prohibited the
devising of lands to nonmembers who were not heirs of the owner,72 and
"authorized the Secretary to take new lands into trust and to add those lands
to reservations." Interestingly, only a small fraction of lands were restored
through the "buy-back" process.74
The IRA also granted the authority for tribes to create their own
constitutions, under which a significant number of tribes still operate
today. 7 To be clear, the IRA did have some small benefits. It reduced the
amount and pace at which trust land was being lost.7 7 But because of the
opportunity for holders to voluntarily request a fee conversion, lands
continued to deplete. While some areas continue to experience net losses
in lands, it is now estimated, from the low of forty-nine million acres held in
trust when the IRA went into effect, that the policies have allowed the trust
holdings to increase to approximately fifty-four million acres today.79
Noteworthy as these accomplishments are, the failure to address the original
allotment fractionation problem condemned allotment holders to a state of
petrified surveillance as the trust land base diminished fraction by fraction.
70. Royster, supra note 26, at 17. The Act designated that lands shall be held in trust "until
otherwise directed by Congress." This remains one great aspect of Indian land policy whereby
Congress has adopted the trust rule for perpetuity. 25 U.S.C. § 462; see also 25 U.S.C. §§
2201-2221 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4061 (2006). Trustees can now petition for removal of
the trust classification and receive a patent. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 152.4-.5 (2011).
71. Royster, supra note 26, at 17; 25 U.S.C. § 463.
72. 25 U.S.C. §464; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2201.
73. Royster, supra note 26, at 17; 25 U.S.C. § 465. This "buy-back" program is similar to
the trust settlement that is being proposed infra Part V.
74. Royster, supra note 26, at 17 & n.90.
75. 25 U.S.C. § 476; McCulley, supra note 6, at 409 ("The IRA encouraged the promotion
of tribal self-government by supporting the formation of tribal constitutions."). For examples
of original constitutions or constitutions that continue in effect or have been revised, see
Constitutions, NATIVE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND LAW DIGITIZATION PROJECT,
http://thorpe.ou.edu/const.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
76. Sledd, supra note 57, at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-781, INDIAN ISSUES: BIA's EFFORTS
TO IMPOSE TIME FRAMES AND COLLECT BETTER DATA SHOULD IMPROVE THE PROCESSING OF
LANDINTRUSTAPPLICATIONS 9(2006) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06781.pdf
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2. The Indian Land Consolidation Act
Even after the passage of the IRA, the question of how to restore the
fractionated lands remained unaddressed. In fact, four years after its passage,
"the Interior Department convened a meeting in Glacier National Park to
identify solutions to fractionation."so The group established three goals:
"decrease administrative cost, increase the productive use of Indian land, and
stop the loss of trust land to fee status" 8 Born of these three goals were three
recommended actions: "address probate procedures to stop further
fractionation, develop consolidation tools, and provide funds to purchase
interests from [voluntary sellers]."82 Unfortunately, timing was again an
issue, with scarce resources to be allocated as a result of the ongoing
depression era and the onslaught of World War 11.8 Congress revisited the
problem in 1960 with the Indian Heirship Land Survey,84 which found that
"only one quarter of the parcels had more than six owners."" Additional
meetings followed in 1966 and 1977. The suggested actions were similar to
those recommended at Glacier, but were ultimately rejected because of either
the anticipated costs to the federal government or dissatisfaction among tribal
landowners.
By 1983, evidence illustrating the magnitude of the problem had grown to
such a point that Congress felt compelled to act, despite its inaction over the
previous half-century. That same year, Congress passed the Indian Land
Consolidation Act (ILCA)." The ILCA authorized the consolidation of tribal
lands through sale, purchase, or other exchanges.89 It also allowed for the
adoption of tribal probate codes to be used in probates through the DOI.9 o
80. Sledd, supra note 57, at 6.
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
8 3. Id.
84. H. COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., INDIAN HEIRSHIP LAND
SURVEY (Comm. Print 1960).
85. Sledd, supra note 57, at 6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2519 (codified as 25
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2221 (2006)).
89. 25 U.S.C. § 2203 (2006); Sledd, supra note 57, at 7.
90. 25 U.S.C. § 2205; Sledd, supra note 57, at 7.
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The ILCA was quite radical. A new definition of "Indian" was used,
significantly narrowing the eligibility for inheriting land." The "most
radical" provision of the ILCA, section 207, "called for escheat to tribes of
interests less than 2% of the whole parcel, testate or intestate, which had not
earned at least $100 in the year prior to probate.""
Soon after the ILCA went into effect, three devisees brought suit
challenging its constitutionality, claiming that the escheat provision
constituted a seizure without just compensation. To nearly everyone's
surprise, Justice O'Connor, in Hodel v. Irving,93 stated:
There is no question that the relative economic impact of § 207
upon the owners of these property rights can be substantial. ...
Even if we accept the Government's assertion that the income
generated by such parcels may be properly thought of as de
minimus, their value may not be. . . . There is no question,
however, that the right to pass on valuable property to one's heirs
is itself a valuable right.94
The Supreme Court in Irving, looking to protect the rights of the deceased to
devise property, struck down the taking as an unconstitutional violation of the
Fifth Amendment" - the first such case since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.9' Even before the Court announced its decision in Irving, Congress
was taking precautions due to the pending lawsuit. In 1984, a nervous
Congress began hearings to amend the ILCA;" the Act was amended in
October of 1984.98 The amended section 207 provided that the land would
not escheat if the interest "represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage
in such tract and is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years
from the date of decedent's death." 9 If it were unable to earn $100 "in any
91. McCulley, supra note 6, at 409.
92. Sledd, supra note 57, at 7.
93. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
94. Id. at 714-15.
95. Id. at 717.
96. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (indicating that government regulation that prevents the use or
severely limits the use of property can amount to a regulatory taking which must be supported
by an action of eminent domain and the payment ofjust compensation); Guzman, supra note
3, at 612 n.67.
97. Sledd, supra note 57, at 7.
98. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-608, 98 Stat. 3171 (1984).
99. Id.
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one of the five years before the decedent's death," a rebuttable presumption
arose that it would be "incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years
following the death of the decedent."'o
The Irving Court, however, did not hear arguments on the 1984
amendments. The amendments eventually found their way before the Court
in Babbitt v. Youpee,o' and were declared unconstitutional on the same
grounds as in Irving. According to Justice Ginsburg,
Amended § 207 still trains on income generated from the land, not
on the value of the parcel. . . . Congress' creation of an ever-so-
slight class of individuals equipped to receive fractional interests
by devise does not suffice, under a fair reading of Irving, to
rehabilitate the measure. Amended § 207 severely restricts the
right of an individual to direct the descent of his property.102
Despite a valiant effort by Congress, the ILCA offered no real solution to the
fractionation problem.
3. The American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994
The fractionation issue is only one part of the overall Indian land problem.
Each original allottee and the subsequent heirs are beneficiaries of IIM
accounts, which purportedly allow them to draw income from their
fractionated interests.103 In 1992, following a congressional oversight
hearing, a report was released, entitled Misplaced Trust, providing an
overview of what the DOI and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were facing
with the management of the IIM accounts. The report found severe
mismanagement through failing to properly account for monies in IIM
accounts, and, in turn, failing to adequately discharge fiduciary
responsibilities. '0 In pertinent part, the report stated:
100. Id.
101. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
102. Id. at 243-44.
103. See Christopher Barrett Bowman, Comment, Indian Trust Fund: Resolution and
Proposed Reformation to the Mismanagement Problems Associated with the Individual Indian
Money Accounts in Light of Cobell v. Norton, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 543, 551(2004).
104. MISPLACED TRUST: THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS' MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN
TRUST FUND, H.R. REP. No. 102-499, at 2 (1992).
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The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has failed to fulfill its
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the Indian trust fund. The
Bureaus [sic] management of the Indian trust fund has been
grossly inadequate in numerous important respects. The Bureau
has failed to accurately account for trust fund moneys. Indeed, it
cannot even provide accountholders with meaningful periodic
statements on their account balances. It cannot consistently and
prudently invest trust funds and pay interest to accountholders. It
does not have consistent written policies or procedures that cover
all of its trust fund accounting practices. Under the management
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Indian trust fund is equivalent
to a bank that doesnt [sic] know how much money it has. . . . The
real losers in the mismanagement of the Indian trust fund are the
Tribes and individual Indian accountholders. . . . Yet victims of
this nonfeasance have had no recourse except to the very agency
that is responsible for their predicament.'o
Moreover, the report created a timeline of sorts, recommending that, if the
DOI and BIA could not reasonably gain control of the IIM situation in a
timely fashion, Congress should take additional action or consider moving the
responsibility for the IIM accounts elsewhere.'0o
With firm evidence from Misplaced Trust in hand, Congress enacted the
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994.107 The Act redefined
the Secretary of the Interior's role in maintaining the trust funds associated
with IIM accounts.'0o Title IT of the Act attempted to allow tribes the ability
to exercise control over their trust funds.'09 Title III created the Office of the
Special Trustee (OST) to "provide for more effective management of, and
accountability for the proper discharge of, the Secretary's trust
responsibilities to Indian tribes and individual Indians."" 0 This provision
applied not only to the OST, but also to the BIA, Minerals Management
105. Id. at 56.
106. Id. at 66.
107. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4061 (2006).
108. Id. § 4011. For another federal provision detailing the Secretary's trust responsibilities,
see 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2006) (noting that the Secretary's trust obligations include
"[p]roviding adequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund balances").
109. 25 U.S.C. § 4022.
110. Id. § 4041(1).
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Service, and the Bureau of Land Management, to ensure that all "trust
responsibilities[] are effective, consistent, and integrated."'"I
In 1997, Paul Homan, appointed as the first Special Trustee, sought to
upgrade computers, clean up trust records, and eliminate backlogs.1 12
Unfortunately, Congress failed to adequately fund the OST to meet all of
these proposed objectives,"' leaving the possibility of rendering a total
accounting impossible and the problem of fractionation alive.
4. American Indian Probate Reform Act
In 2004, Congress passed the American Indian Probate Reform Act
(AIPRA)"l4 to correct the failed policies of the IRA and ILCA."'
Specifically, Congress sought to address the continued problem of
fractionation by revising probate procedures in Indian Country to facilitate
consolidation of fractionated lands."' "The AIPRA changes the probate laws
for Indian property belonging to Native American individuals who die
intestate."' 17 The most significant policy shift flows from "the creation of a
uniform, national Indian probate code that replaces the burdensome various
state probate code provisions.""'
The AIPRA has several major advantages to combat the fractionation
problem. First, without a valid will, "trust property will pass under the new
federal probate code or approved tribal probate code, rather than under the
state laws that currently govern Indian probate."" 9 Under the AIPRA,
immediate family members are still first in line to inherit, but they "are only
entitled to inherit the property if they either a) meet the definition of 'Indian,'
b) are the decedent's descendants within two generations of an Indian, or c)
they are already co-owners of the same parcel of land." 2o Special provisions
111. Id. § 4041(2).
112. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 1092.
114. Pub. L. No. 108-374, 118 Stat. 1773 (2004).
115. See McCulley, supra note 6, at 412-13.
116. Id. at 411.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 410.
119. Understanding the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, TRIBAL COURT
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/understanding.htm (last visited Apr. 25,
2011) [hereinafter Understanding the AIPRA].
120. McCulley, supra note 6, at 413. Congress amended the definition of Indian in the
AIPRA.
Under AIPRA, an "Indian" is a person who: 1) is a member of an Indian tribe, or
2) is eligible to become a member of an Indian tribe; or 3) was an owner of an
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also appear for spouses. For example, "spouse[s] will inherit 1/3 of any
money in [an] IIM account at the time of [decedent's] death, and all of the
money produced from [decedent's] interest in trust or restricted land during
[a] spouse's lifetime."12 ' The spouse can also "continue to live in a family
home located on allotted land."I 22 The category of takers also includes "other
eligible heirs," who are entitled to receive "the remaining 2/3 of any money
in [the decedent's] IIM account . . . and the remaining ownership interest in
the trust or restricted land." 2 3
Comparison of Intestacy Distribution Under Oklahoma Law and AIPRAl24
Oklahoma 2  AIPRA'16
Surviving spouse and Spouse receives 1/2 of the Spouse receives 1/3 of
children estate and children share trust personalty and life
other 1/2, regardless of estate in trust land; when
how many there are. spouse dies, each "eligible
heir"'2 7 receives an equal
share in trust and restricted
land interests.
interest in trust restricted land on October 27, 2004; or 4) meets the definition of
"Indian" under the Indian Reorganization Act, or 5) in California, any person as
in 1, 2, 3, and 4, or who owns trust or restricted land in California.
Understanding the AIPRA, supra note 119.
121. Understanding the AIPRA, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. This chart demonstrates the distributional schemes under the Oklahoma intestacy
statutes and the AIPRA for lands equal to or greater than five percent of the fractional whole.
125. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (2010).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (2006); Cecelia Burke, Without a Valid Will, Your Trust Land
Interests 5% or Greater Will Be Divided as Follows, INDIAN INST.: SEATTLE U. SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.indianwills.org/LandownerDownloads/YourTrustLandInterests5perntOrGreater
.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
127. An "eligible heir" includes "any of the decedent's children, grandchildren, great
grandchildren, full siblings, half siblings by blood, and parents who are .. . Indian; or . .. lineal
descendants within 2 degrees ofconsanguinity of an Indian; or . .. owners of a trust." 25 U.S.C.
§ 2201(9).
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Oklahoma AIPRA
Spouse and no children Spouse receives all joint Spouse receives all trust
industry property and 1/3 personalty and life estate
non-joint industry in trust land; when spouse
property; parent(s) take the dies, interests pass to other
other 2/3 of non-joint "eligible" heirs listed
industry property. below.
No spouse but surviving Children share equally; if Each "eligible" child
children or grandchildren child predeceases parent, receives equal share in
grandchildren receive their trust lands; if child
parents' share. predeceases parent,
grandchildren receive their
parents' share.
No spouse and no To any survivors in the Surviving parents share
surviving children, second parentela (parents equally; if none, then
grandchildren, or great- or descendants of parents); "eligible" siblings share
grandchildren if none, to any survivors equally; if none, then to
within the third parentela tribe with jurisdiction; if
(grandparents or none of the above, then
descendants of rules allow co-owners to
grandparents); if none, to take or purchase interests
next-of-kin, or permit sale by United
States.
Undoubtedly the most controversial provision of the AIPRA is the so-
called less-than-five-percent rule. This provision states that if an Indian
landowner dies intestate and "no applicable Indian tribal probate code trumps
the AIPRA," inheritance of a less-than-five-percent interest in the whole is
limited "to the decedent's oldest eligible child, then the oldest eligible
grandchild, or the oldest eligible great-grandchild."' Though the spouse
"retains the right to live in the family home on the fractionated parcel during
his or her lifetime, . . . the DOI may purchase interests in land that are less
128. McCulley, supra note 6, at 414.
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than 5% of the total interest, for fair market value, during the probate
proceeding without the consent of the heirs."'29
The AIPRA also includes a "purchase option at probate." The purchase
option allows "the decedent's heirs, other co-owners of the land held in trust,
and the tribe where the land is located, [to] purchase the decedent's interest
in the parcel, [provided that] the purchase price [] equal[s] [] or exceed[s] the
fair market value.""'0 This process helps to meet a major objective of the Act
- to reduce the number of fractionated lands."' For example, if one's land
equals less than five percent of the total parcel, "heirs would receive the
money paid for the decedent's interest in the parcel instead of a share of the
decedent's interest in the parcel."'3 2  But "[i]f the decedent's heirs'
entitlements constitute greater than or equal to 5% of the total interest in the
parcel, or if they live on the parcel, the heirs' consent to the purchase is
required.""'
While the laudable goals of the AIPRA are extraordinary and seek to
eliminate the further fractionation of lands, problems still exist. First, the
AIPRA merely reduces future fractionation; it does not adequately provide an
efficient redress to over one hundred years of fractionation. Second, though
future fractionation is reduced, tribal customs and beliefs are often ignored,
and the new AIPRA could ultimately depreciate tribal sovereignty.'34 And,
like the ILCA in Irving and Youpee, if the AIPRA is found to infringe upon
the right to pass land to one's heirs, it could be declared unconstitutional."'
Despite the federal government's continued efforts to solve the fractionation
conundrum, a worthy solution has yet to be implemented.
129. Id. at 414-15.
130. Id. at 415.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 416.
135. Nina Brown, History of AIPRA 11 (Spring 2006) (unpublished article), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/programs/indianlaw/aipra/History.AIPRA.pdf ("The
possibility that this right would be found to be fundamental is fairly substantial, given its roots
in this nation's history, and the protection given to land ownership stated in the Constitution.").
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IV. Cobell v. Salazar: The Long Road to Justice
A. A Simple Accounting
In June of 1996, Elouise Pepion Cobell, on behalf of herself and others,'36
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the then-Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, seeking
redress for a breach of trust by the federal government regarding its
administration of IIM accounts.' Specifically, the complaint sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the federal government for breach of
its ongoing trust obligations, and requested an accounting of individual Indian
trust assets.' 38 In February of 1997, the court "granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Action Certification . . . 'on behalf of a plaintiff class consisting of
present and former beneficiaries of IIM Accounts."" 3 9 In December 1999,
the court found the defendants to be in breach of certain duties. It found that
"[t]he Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act .. . requires the defendants
to provide plaintiffs an accurate accounting of all money held in the IIM
trust" and "to retrieve and retain all information concerning the IIM trust that
is necessary to render an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust
held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs."'40 Moreover, defendants have duties
to "establish written policies and procedures for collecting . . . missing
information [and] . . . for the staffing of trust management functions," to
retain "documents necessary to render an accurate accounting," and to
establish "computer and business systems necessary to render an accurate
accounting."l 4 ' The court found the defendants to be in breach of these duties
and ordered them promptly to comply.14 2
136. Complaint at 4-5, Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 96-1285)
("Plaintiff Cobell is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe.... Plaintiff Old Person
is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe. . . . Plaintiff Cleghorn is an enrolled
member of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe (Oklahoma).... Plaintiff Maulson is an enrolled member
of the Lac du Flambeau Chippewa Tribe (Wisconsin). . . . Plaintiff LaRose is an enrolled
member of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska... . All plaintiffs bring this action on their own
behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated.").
137. Class Action Settlement Agreement at 2, Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (No. 08-5500) [hereinafter Agreement].
138. Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
139. Agreement, supra note 137, at 2-3.
140. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Less than two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the
defendants were in breach of their statutory duties.1"' The court of appeals
noted that "[t]he Interior Department has failed to discharge the fiduciary
duties it owes to IIM beneficiaries for decades. Despite passage of the 1994
act, the Department is still unable to execute the most fundamental of trust
duties - an accurate accounting."'" These findings, however, did not cement
guilt or cause the DOI to admit fault, and the litigation continued. In 2008,
the court modified the 1997 Class Certification Order by determining that,
"[o]n October 25, 1994, a statutory right to an accounting accrued for all
then-living IIM beneficiaries: those who held or at any point in their lives had
held IIM Accounts."l45 The district court and the court of appeals also
imposed further restrictions by excluding funds received on a "direct pay"
basis, 146 excluding funds "managed by tribes,"l 47 excluding "accounts closed
before the 1994 Act was passed,"' 48 and finally, excluding "heirs to money
from closed accounts" that were subject to final probate determinations. 149
B. Class Action Settlement Agreement
After nearly fifteen years of litigation and an "estimate[] that between
300,000 and 500,000 Indians [had] been deprived of between ten and forty
billion dollars as a result of one hundred years of trust fund mismanagement
by the federal government,"'s the parties agreed in principle to a settlement''
143. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 1110.
145. Cobell v. Kempthome, 532 F. Supp. 2d 37, 98 (D.D.C. 2008).
146. Id. at 95-96.
147. Id. at 96.
148. Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Act refers to the American
Indian Trust Managment Reform Act of 1994 which was passed on October 25, 1994).
149. Id.
150. Bowman, supra note 103, at 543-44; see also INDIAN TRUST SETTLEMENT,
http://cobellsettlement.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
151. Settlement Agreement and Modifications, INDIAN TRUST SETTLEMENT, http://cobell
settlement.com/sa.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). The original class action settlement
agreement was dated December 7, 2009. Id. Eight subsequent modifications were made and
extensions for settlement granted by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. The final modification, dated November 17, 2010, concluded the modifications
to the settlement agreement, which were subsequently adopted by both the United States House
of Representatives and the United States Senate, and signed into law on December 8, 2010 by
President Obama. Id.; David Jackson, Obama Signs $4.6B Settlement with Black Farmers,
Native Americans, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2010 available at http://content.usatoday.com/comm
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to bring an end to "the largest class-action suit ever filed by Indians."s 2 As
is customary with most settlement agreements, the federal government and
the respective secretaries "deny any and all liability and damages" to the
beneficiaries or mismanagement of funds, but agreed to settle "to avoid the
burden, expense, and uncertainty of continuing the case." 53 When analyzing
the impact that the settlement could potentially have on IIM account holders,
it is important to note that these IIM accounts contain not only land, but also
royalties from oil, natural gas, and other minerals, as well as rents from
timber operations, grazing, water rights, and any other resources controlled
by individual Indians.IS4
The settlement establishes three distinct categories to which funds are to
be distributed, of which $1.412 billion will be deposited into an
Accounting/Trust Administration Fund,"' $60 million will be used to create
an Indian Education Scholarship Fund to improve access to higher
education,"' and (most importantly for purposes of solving the Indian land
fractionation problem) $1.9 billion will be used to finance a Trust Land
Consolidation Fund (Consolidation Fund)."' The Consolidation Fund seems
incongruent with the original goals of the Cobell litigation. The original
complaint makes no mention of or request for a land consolidation fund. So
how did it end up in the settlement? The answer can be found through a
backward-looking examination of the failed policies that have haunted the
federal government's trust administration duties since reorganization. The
settlement agreement itself states "that an integral part of trust reform
includes accelerating correction of the fractionated ownership of trust or
restricted land, which makes administration of the individual Indian trust
more difficult." 58 Moreover, the parties are seeking to address the problems
of escheat and takings under the Fifth Amendment that were encountered in
Youpee and Irving, which, without these available avenues for redress,
unities/theoval/post/2010/12/obama-signs-46-billion-settlement-with-black-farmers-native-
americans/1(last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
152. Timothy Egan, A Computer Shutdown Plays Havoc at Interior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2002, at A20.
153. Agreement, supra note 137, at 5.
154. What Are Individual Money ("IM") Accounts?, INDIAN TRUST SETTLEMENT,
http://www.cobellsettlement.com/faq.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
155. Agreement, supra note 137, at 26.
156. Id. at 40.
157. November 17, 2010 Modification of December 7, 2009 Class Action Settlement
Agreement at 3, Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-5506).
158. Agreement, supra note 137, at 4.
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continued to propagate fractionation, increasing the already daunting
administrative burden of reconciling the Indian trust.'
The most important function of the Consolidation Fund is "acquiring
fractional interests in trust or restricted lands."' 60 Yet, equally important are
the administrative costs of "implementing the Land Consolidation Program"
and "the costs related to the work of the Secretarial Commission on Trust
Reform."' 6 ' Though the latter two are limited to only fifteen percent of the
overall fund monies, these three components comprise the sole uses for
purposes of the fund. 162
Moreover, any lands acquired shall be for the full fair market value of the
lands.'16 Ironically, it will be up to the reasonable efforts of the Secretary of
the Interior "to prioritize the consolidation of the most highly fractionated
lands."'" This should theoretically be a relatively easy task. Given the lack
of proper accounting for decades, however, it seems probable that the DOI
could have a difficult time properly prioritizing consolidation efforts without
a full and accurate accounting of the lands to be consolidated. From the time
final approval is granted for the agreement, the DOI has, at most, ten years to
completely exhaust the monies in the Consolidation Fund, otherwise the
monies must be returned to the Treasury. 165
V The Wheat Fields Waving and the Dust Clouds Rolling: Potential
Solutions to the Indian Land Fractionation Problem
A. The Big Bail-Out
The Cobell Settlement authorizes the expenditure of $1.9 billion dollars to
acquire and consolidate highly fractionated Indian lands. Previous attempts
to do so, such as the ILCA, resulted in unconstitutional takings in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. Essential to this analysis, however, is that previous
attempts to rectify allotment policies failed to properly provide just
compensation for the takings. While a goal of the Cobell settlement is to
reacquire lands that are highly fractionated, for the first time, significant
159. Id.
160. Id. at 35.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 36.
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monies are being devoted to help restructure the recovery from the damage
of over one hundred years of failed allotment policy.
One billion nine hundred million dollars is no small amount of money.
Consider this: $1.9 billion will buy you eighty-six percent of a B-2 bomber;
$1.9 billion will allow you to wage war for ninety-one hours on two Middle-
Eastern countries; $1.9 billion is equal to nearly two years of profits for
General Mills; $1.9 billion is roughly the amount of taxes collected from
197,000 Americans in any given year.'66 Some may therefore be surprised
that this extraordinary amount of money is still insufficient to properly bring
an end to the Indian land fractionation problem.
Federal purchase of fractionated interests is not a new solution to the
fractionation problem. As early as 1994, programs were proposed whereby
the federal government would buy highly fractionated interests and turn
control of them over to individual Indian tribes. "A three-year pilot program
was established with three tribes in Wisconsin and 36,000 interests were
acquired."' 67 Early estimates showed that the federal government could save
over $2.5 million in administration costs currently used to maintain the
fractionated interests.16 1 Prior to 2006, $97 million was spent on land
consolidation, resulting in the acquisition of 243,000 interests.16 ' Even more
stunning is that the purchase of these interests "prevent[ed] the creation of
roughly 600,000 new interests."o
Fractionation has continued for so long and is continuing to grow at such
an unprecedented pace that these interests were just a fraction of the total
number of interests created. Moreover, consider that even without any
increase, it is estimated "that it would cost $135 million each year just to
maintain the current level of fractionation."' 7 ' Thus, of the $1.9 billion in
funds delegated to acquire highly fractionated lands, half of the total that
would otherwise be spent to prioritize and consolidate highly fractionated
lands under the Cobell settlement would be expended simply to maintain
current levels of fractionation.172 This is because the money expended to
166. Visualizing One Billion Dollars, WALLSTATS, http://www.wallstats.com/blog/visuali
zing-one-billion-dollars/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
167. Brian Sawers, Tribal Land Corporation: Using Incorporation to Combat Fractionation,
88 NEB. L. REv. 385, 403 (2010).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. Multiplying the $135 million per year that it would take to maintain current
levels of fractionation by the maximum of ten years to distribute the funds from the settlement
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maintain the already fractionated lands takes away from the outright purchase
of highly fractionated lands that would continue to grow. Moreover, that
seventy percent of heirs would voluntarily agree to the sale of their
fractionated interests indicates that a large portion of the most highly
fractionated land could readily be acquired, thus creating an unfunded
opportunity to prevent future fractionation and reducing strain on the already
low settlement figure."'
Nationally, "there are approximately four million owner interests in the 10
million acres of individually owned trust lands." 74 Research indicates that
"[t]hese four million interests could expand to 11 million interests by the year
2030.""' Oklahoma has roughly one million acres of trust land and about one
million acres of restricted land.'76 In 2000, 391,900 Oklahomans voluntarily
self-identified as tribal members or as being of Native American descent. 7
Obviously, not all Oklahoma tribal members or trust lands are subject to IIM
accounts or beneficiary monies."' For the sake of simplicity, however,
assume that the average cost of an acre of land that would be comparable to
the size of an original allotment in the state of Oklahoma is $1,483.179
Applying simple multiplication, the value of the roughly one million acres of
land held in trust would equal approximately $1.483 billion. The value of the
yields a value of $1.35 billion dollars, which would exhaust over half of the designated $1.9
billion allocated for land consolidation.
173. JOHN DOSSETT, NAT'L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
CONSOLIDATION OF FRACTIONATED INTERESTS AS A PART OF THE COBELL SETTLEMENT
LEGISLATION 2 (2006) [hereinafter NCAI, COBELL SETTLEMENT].
174. RESTORING TRUST, supra note 54, at 5.
175. Id.
176. Did You Know That..., 81 OKLA. B.J. 357 (2010) (advertisement for the Indian Law
Section of the Oklahoma Bar Association). "Restricted land" means that an individual Indian
or "tribe holds legal title but with legal restrictions against alienation or encumbrance."
Definitions ofCommon Terminology Related to Tribal and Indian Land Ownership, TRIBAL&
INDIAN LAND, http://teeic.anl.gov/triballandlindex.cfin (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
177. Gina Claczko, Native American Statistics, NATIVE VILLAGE, http://nativevillage.org/
Messages%20from%20the%2OPeople/Population%20statistics.htm (last visited Apr.25,2011).
178. It is currently unknown how many IIM account holders are members of Oklahoma
tribes. Attempts were made to calculate an accurate number from a variety of sources but for
fear of speculation and non-verification specific numbers have been removed from this
comment.
179. Oklahoma AgriculturalLand Values by Size ofTract, OKLA. STATE U.: AGRICULTURAL
ECON. EXTENSION HOME, http://agecon.okstate.edu/oklandvalues/tracts.asp?id=F (last visited
Apr. 25, 2011). This figure denotes land sales over the past three years involving the sale of
acreage between forty and one hundred acres of land. This figure was chosen due to the fact
that most original allotments were between forty and eighty acres. See id.
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ten million acres using the average Oklahoma value would be nearly $15
billion.'s
The actual number of parcels in Oklahoma that would be classified as
highly fractionated is likely low, but the sheer value of the Oklahoma trust
lands is astonishing. While lands vary in value according to their highest and
best use,"' it can reasonably be anticipated that the initial $1.9 billion
allocation for the purchase of highly fractionated lands will not even scratch
the surface of the overall allotment problem. Moreover, even the level of
fractionation among allotted lands is not proportional. Estimates of the
number of highly fractionated parcels - those having more than two hundred
owners per parcel - are somewhere in the range of two thousand.182 Applying
the average Oklahoma land values ($1,483) to these parcels and multiplying
by an estimated parcel size of eighty acres would yield an estimated value of
roughly $237 million. One would logically conclude that the initial $1.9
billion would be sufficient to handle the fractionation problem with respect
to these highly fractionated parcels. Yet, research reveals that only seventy
percent of interest holders would be willing to sever their interests in
exchange for a payment.'13  This figure leaves thirty percent of interest
holders without a means to avoid having their lands surreptitiously
fractionated upon death, perhaps basing their refusal to sell on strong ties with
the land for religious or ancestral reasons.
Another troubling factor in the initial allocation of monies with the Cobell
settlement is that the monies are subject to identification and time limitations
to correct land fractionation. First, the DOI is to "use reasonable efforts to
prioritize the consolidation of the most highly fractionated tracts of land."'"
Yet, within the settlement document itself, there are no guidelines for how to
identify the most highly fractionated lands. In essence, the class is allowing
the DOI to impose its own timeline and formula for determining highly
fractionated lands. Perhaps it is undeserved skepticism, but have we not seen
this exact behavior before and did it not result in over fifteen years of
180. This figure does not take into account the effects oftrust status on land values. Because
of the restrictions on alienation, the value of trust land is ostensibly less, though the degree to
which the encumbrance affects land values is difficult precisely to ascertain.
181. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 1682 (defining highest and best use in
the valuation of property as "the use that will generate the most profit" and noting that it is the
"standard used especially to determine the fair market value of property subject to eminent
domain").
182. NCAI, COBELL SETrLEMENT, supra note 173, at 4.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Agreement, supra note 137, at 35.
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litigation? The litigation arose because the BIA failed to properly identify
accounts and lands subject to its trust responsibilities to IIM account holders.
Now, the class is essentially giving them the reins to once again violate the
trust.
Second, the DOI is limited to ten years to liquidate the monies in the
Consolidation Fund.'15 If the account is not liquidated within the time period,
the money must be returned to the Treasury.' The economic reality of this
stipulation means that, to ensure that the ten-year period does not lapse, the
DOI must identify and begin to acquire the most highly fractionated parcels
within five years. This is especially troubling for the interest holders who are
classified as "whereabouts unknown." For this special class of persons, the
DOI must satisfy additional stipulations to locate as many interest holders as
possible.' These additional procedures are notice-related, and, if satisfied,
the owners are deemed to consent to the conveyance of their fractionated
interests after five years from the date of final approval, with the proceeds to
be placed in IIM accounts.' Moreover, the limited time period restricts the
legal rights of those owning fractionated interests by denying them sufficient
time to seek legal advice. Though there is strong evidence that a high
percentage would be willing to sell their individual interests, the time
constraints inherent in identification, providing appropriate notice, receiving
competent legal advice, and making a decision to purchase or sell will place
a significant burden on interest holders.
The government, in lieu of a specific time period acquisition, should
instead move to a continuous acquisition process. The ability of the DOI to
acquire lands regardless of a specific time period allows the prioritization
sought by Cobell, and provides the opportunity to continue to foster a
relationship with interest holders to ultimately solve the fractionation
problem. Chiefly, this will help to address the limited resources budget that
the DOI is afforded to consolidate highly fractionated parcels. The expansion
of the pool of resources will allow the DOI to collectively consolidate lands,
without the pressure of continued fractionation from a lack of congressional
funding.
While monetary resources are definitely necessary to solve the
fractionation problem, it is difficult to estimate the true cost. Land values
fluctuate over time and interest holders are each unique in their desire for
185. Id. at 36.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id at 36-38.
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their property. The initial $1.9 billion dollars to be allocated to the land
consolidation fund is a start, but for continued viability, Congress needs to
create a sustaining body or account with the sole purpose of preventing the
future fractionation of Indian lands. Until proper resources are allocated,
fractionation will continue to deprive future generations of Indian land
holders the opportunity to prosper.
B. A Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act
Indian land fractionation has continued to grow at an unprecedented pace.
Despite the attempted actions of the ILCA and the subsequent revisions, there
has remained a stalemate of sorts to the final resolution of the fractionation
problem. Other areas of the law, however, have allowed local governments
to reach beyond the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to prevent further
fractionation of interests in land. One such example is the adoption of
dormant mineral acts across the United States.'89 Dormant mineral acts are
highly specialized to prevent waste and increase the productivity of natural
resources by "terminat[ing] mineral interests and reunit[ing] them with the
interest from which they were carved . . . [and] identify[ing] and locat[ing]
mineral interest owners."' 90 A Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act could
help to solve the problem of fractionation of Indian lands while passing power
to individual tribes to control and dispose of the land for its highest and best
use.
1. The History and Development ofDormant Mineral Acts
The concept for a dormant mineral act was first introduced by the state of
Indiana. In 1971, Indiana passed the Dormant Mineral Act.'9 ' The Act
defined "interest" as one that is either granted, assigned, reserved, or any
other interest.192 The Act provided that if any of the interests were "unused
for a period of twenty (20) years, [the interest would be] extinguished and the
ownership [would revert] to" the primary interest holder from which the
interests were carved out. 93 In addition, the Act set out a list of approved
uses.' 94 Most importantly, the Act provided that each interest holder must
make a statement of claim before the end of the statutory period, to be filed
189. JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 69 (5th ed. 2008).
190. Id. at 69-70.
191. IND. CODE §§ 32-23-10-1 to -8 (2002).
192. Id. § 32-23-10-1.
193. Id. § 32-23-10-2.
194. Id. § 32-23-10-3.
No. 2] 603
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
AMERICAN INDIANLA WREVIEW
in the county in which the land is located.' Failure to make a claim would
extinguish the interests, limited by a small set of exceptions that usually
centered on individuals with a larger number of interests within the county.'9
Notice of the lapse may be given through some sort of publication, and be
recorded.197
The Act was subsequently challenged as an unconstitutional taking when,
in 1982, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Texaco, Inc. v. Short.19 8
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the state "has the power
to enact the kind of legislation at issue" because it furthers the state's goals
of encouraging the development of interests.'99 The Court reasoned that there
could not be an unconstitutional taking where an interest holder has had
twenty years to take actions to retain possession, and is thus deemed to have
abandoned the property.2 00 It noted that "[i]t is the owner's failure to make
any use of the property - and not the action of the State - that causes the lapse
of the property right." 20' Additionally, the Court agreed that
[t]he statute cannot be said to impair a contract that did not exist
at the time of its enactment. . . . [A] mineral owner may safeguard
any contractual obligations or rights by filing a statement of claim
. . . [and] a minimal "burden" on contractual obligations is not
beyond the scope of permissible state action.202
Finally, the Court stated that the lack of a notice requirement does not render
the statute unconstitutional because citizens are charged with knowing the
laws of the state,203 and "[t]he 2-year grace period included in the Indiana
statute forecloses any argument that the statute is invalid because mineral
owners may not have had an opportunity to become familiar with its
terms."2M
Since the decision in Short, several states have enacted dormant mineral
acts.205 The acts became such a hot topic in the early 1980s that the National
195. Id. § 32-23-10-4.
196. Id. § 32-23-10-5.
197. Id. §§ 32-23-10-6, -7.
198. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
199. Id at 529.
200. Id. at 530.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 531.
203. Id. at 532.
204. Id. at 532.
205. Michigan, Indiana, California, Connecticut, Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon, South
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a model
Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act.2 06 The model act differs from the
Indiana act in that it requires that notice be given to the individual interest
holders prior to the recording of the termination claim.207 Several states have
enacted this provision as well, mostly to combat the argument that land,
fundamental to our system of wealth, is being taken simply because it remains
idle.208  Kansas, for example, requires notice by publication, and, if the
address of the interest holder is known, that he be mailed a copy within ten
days by restricted mail.209  A similar provision can be found in North
Dakota's dormant mineral act.2"0 These limiting provisions seem to defeat the
entire purpose of the dormant mineral acts. The risk, of course, is that after
the statutory period, when a party prepares and expends significant resources
obtaining legal advice, the interests can be reclaimed by the holder upon
receipt of notice of the pending action.
2. The Model Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act
While Congress has rarely granted such expansive powers to the Indian
tribes, the creation of a Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act could
facilitate an end to the fractionation problem. Arguably, the initial distinction
that must be made is that most of the interests involved in Indian land
fractionation are interests in the whole of the parcel, rather than severed
mineral rights. The conundrum that interest holders often face is that they are
unable to productively use the land because there are so many interest holders
Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have enacted dormant mineral
statutes. Other states, such as Louisiana, Florida, Minnesota, and North Carolina, use
marketable title laws. See ScoTr HOWARD, MINERAL RIGHTS AND LAND CONSERVATION IN THE
MIDWEST 2 (2008), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/conservation-
defense/CDdocuments/Mineral%20and%20gas%20rights%20extraction%20March202008.pdf
206. UNIF. DORMANT MINERALINTERESTS ACT (1986), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bllarchives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/udmia86.pdf.
207. Id. § 4(a) ("The action must be in the nature of and requires the same notice as is
required in an action to quiet title.").
208. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bishop, 412 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1980) ("While we recognize the
beneficial purpose of the statute to facilitate the production ofexisting oil, gas and other mineral
resources, particularly where ownership of the interests has become increasingly fractionalized
and scattered, the record owners are vested with property interests entitled to the procedural
safeguards of due process. Failure to provide these owners with adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional.").
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1605 (2005).
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06.1 (2009).
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to each individual parcel.211 The tribal tradition of passing land to family
members without wills has created a distribution scheme where the interest
holders often do not know one another or are so far removed from the
controlling holders that identifying them is nearly impossible.212
Congress has already recognized the problematic effects of land
fractionation. The development and passage of the AIPRA is palpable
evidence that the problem is still at the forefront of issues troubling Indian
Country. The passage of such expansive legislation as a Dormant Tribal
Fractional Interests Act would be the first complete break from the
government's so-called protectionist mentality.2 13
The development of a Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act would help
to alleviate the fractionation burden and allow productive use of the interests.
The initial problem would be deciding to which interests the Act would apply.
Several examples advance the line of thought that any devise of property
should be covered.214 This approach would encompass the totality of all
211. Bobroff, supra note 3, at 1617-18 ("Fractionated ownership greatly increases the
difficulty of developing land, both for co-owners seeking to use the land for their own purposes
and for tribal communities seeking to provide infrastructure and services across allotted lands.
Putting in utilities, establishing roads, harvesting forestry and mineral resources, developing
commercial uses, and obtaining homesite leases for residences all become increasingly
expensive in time, money, and effort as fractionation grows.").
212. See id at 1618 ("[F]ractionation grows worse with each owner's passing as ownership
is divided among another generation. Occasionally, an owner will have made provisions to pass
his or her interest to a single family member. More often, however, allotment interests pass
through intestate succession. Some owners have long since left the reservation, if they ever
lived there, or have lost ties that their families once had. Many owners have such small interests
that it is not worth their time or energy to address the question of inheritance of their
interests."); Guzman, supra note 3, at 607 ("It is difficult to identify and locate allottees, given
the infamous multiple successive intestate estates, probate backlog, and outdated, incomplete,
or irretrievable records with limited rights of access that often characterize allotted lands.").
213. See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 899, 950 (1998) ("Tribal self-determination is denied
whenever the United States asserts its trust responsibility and imposes its view of ensuring the
well-being of the Indian nations. While treaty provisions acknowledged that the United States
would provide 'protection' to the Indian nations, the Supreme Court expanded this limited and
negotiated protection into a full-blown 'guardian-ward' relationship that has justified the
suppression of tribal self-determination.") (citation omitted).
214. For example, the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act covers interests created by
reservation, deed, profit, or leasehold. See UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT prefatory
note, at 1 (1986), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/
udmia86.pdf.
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Indian land interests, which is beneficial to preventing fractionation over the
long term no matter the size or scope of the interest to which it pertains.
Timing is of the essence, as fractionation continues with each passing
day."' In the over 120 years since the inception of the fractionation problem,
millions - if not billions or trillions - of interests have been created in Indian
lands, all stemming from the original allotments.2 16 Because of the
immediacy of the problem, a departure from the dormant mineral acts is
necessary, as a twenty-year period of non-use allows the continued
fractionation of lands and the potential for millions of interests to be created
in the interim. Therefore, a much shorter time period should be employed for
tribes or individual interest holders to exercise their right to bring the interests
to productive uses. One potential option is a time period of non-use for five
years, following a grace period for the law to take effect and tribal members
to educate themselves. The five-year period allows sufficient time for interest
holders to discover their holdings, make a recording with the individual
Indian tribes, and work with the other interest holders to create an
environment that will put the land to its highest and most productive use. For
ease of application, once the term has lapsed, no quiet title action need be
brought. Instead, a recording in the office of the tribe or the jurisdiction in
which the land is located will provide sufficient record title to the interest.217
Next, Congress must determine factors for defining "use" as related to the
interests. Potential uses could include participating in maintenance and
repairs, visiting the property, leasing the property collectively, engaging in
recreational activities, payment of taxes, or acceptance of IIM transactions.
The bottom line is that the use should be an active use. The interest should
not be permitted to remain in perpetuity despite inaction. Yet, some case law
suggests that leasing of property is insufficient to prevent a lapse.m Leasing,
however, is a common right included in the "bundle of sticks," and by signing
or negotiating a lease, one asserts a right to an interest in that property. Under
215. Shoemaker, supra note 38, at 730 ("Fractionation not only persists but is worsening
exponentially as already small interests continue to be subdivided into progressively smaller
shares, usually through formulaic application of state intestacy laws.").
216. Guzman, supra note 3, at 598 ("[C]ommon denominators have reached 54 trillion,
billions are not uncommon, and millions [approach the norm].") (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
217. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-23-10-3 (2002) (suggesting in comments that a quiet title
action is not necessary to effectuate the lapse of a mineral interest); McCoy v. Richards, 623
F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Ind. 1984), af'd, 771 F.2d 1108, 1110 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the filing
of a statement of claim was necessary to prevent a lapse).
218. E.g., Kirby v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (Ind. App. 1984).
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the proposed Act, leasing should therefore constitute an active use, sufficient
to prevent a lapse.
The filing of a statement of claim could also be burdensome to interest
holders seeking to make their interests more productive. Most statutes require
that, after the initial lapse, the recording contain the name of the interest
holder against whom the action is brought, as well as a description of the
land.219 While the land description should easily be satisfied, fractionation
has created so many interests that it can be unreasonably burdensome to track
down each interest holder. Congress could alleviate this pressure by
supplanting the name and address requirements with an allowance for all
owners of an individual parcel to screen for IIM numbers. This allowance
would help to preserve confidential information of the interest holders, while
still allowing interest holders seeking to consolidate interests the opportunity
to track developments within their particular parcels.
Another interesting complexity that must be resolved is where the initial
statement of claim should be recorded. Tribal governments may ensure
access to all tribal members, but there remains the possibility that interest
holders are not enrolled members of those tribes. Accordingly, tribal land
recordation systems may not adequately provide notice to interest holders
who live outside Indian Country. Perhaps a logical system could include the
formation of a federal government filing system whereby tribal members can
track their IIM interests in fractionated lands, similar to the patent and
trademark filing systems,220 but to which nonmembers and non-Indians may
also gain access to monitor their holdings. While this could potentially create
initial ambiguity, after the lapse of the time period, individual holders could
also file their instruments in state recordation systems, which would further
help to quiet title. Regardless, the potential claimants should be given the
permissive capability to serve notice on holders to be deprived, but should not
be required to do so. This system will allow interest holders who are vigilant
219. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1605 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06 (2009).
220. Similar to the patent filing system, the Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act would
require a written application with certain required information, such as the name of the party
seeking the action and a legal description of the land. A fee could be collected to cover the
costs of administration. The DOI and BIA could then grant provisional land status while
awaiting official publication. This publication would supply the public with the requisite
information to apprise potential interest holders of their fractionated interests and an opportunity
to take corrective action to assert their rights. Ideally, the entire process would be electronic
and updated instantaneously with each application. For regulations governing the patent filing
system, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 122 (2006).
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in their efforts and who have complied fully with the statute to create a larger
interest, and, in turn, to once again make the land economically productive.
The following is a humble attempt to fashion a Dormant Tribal Fractional
Interests Act. Its purpose is to respond to the problems posed above and to
contribute to the ongoing effort to combat fractionation.
Model Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act.'
§ 1. Short Title
This act may be cited as the Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests
Act.
§ 2. Purpose of Act
(A) The public policy of this Act is to enable and encourage the
marketability of Indian-owned real property and to mitigate the
adverse effects of the allotment policy and the resulting
fractionation of lands on the full use and development of
individual and tribal interests in real property.
(B) This Act shall be construed to effectuate its purpose to
provide a means for terminating dormant interests in highly
fractionated lands that impair the development and marketability
of those lands.
§ 3. Definitions
(A) "Dormant" means a state of non-use for a term of not less
than five years.
(B) "Fractionated ownership" means ownership of an interest
of less than the whole.
(C) "Recordation" is the act of making an official record within
the Department of the Interior's Indian Land Interest Recordation
System to apprise third parties of an interest and its whereabouts.
(D) "Tribal fractional interest" means an interest in land held by
multiple joint owners as the result of allotment.
221. This proposed Act is based in large part and follows the format of UNIF. DoRMANT
MINERAL INTERESTs ACT (1986), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bil/archives/ule/
fiact99/1980s/udmia86.pdf.
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§ 4. Termination of Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests
(A) A co-owner of a highly fractionated parcel of previously
allotted lands may maintain an action to terminate a dormant tribal
fractional interest. A tribal fractional interest is dormant for the
purpose of this Act if the interest is unused within the meaning of
subsection (B) for a period of five or more years preceding the
action, and that has not been preserved pursuant to subsection (B).
The action must be in the nature of and requires the same as is
required for quiet title actions to be administered within the
Department of the Interior, namely asserting: the legal description
of the property, the names of all parties to the action, and a
statement of the factual and legal basis for seeking the action. The
action may be maintained regardless of whether the whereabouts
of the owner of the dormant tribal fractional interest is known.
Disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of any
person does not suspend the running of the five-year period.
(B) For purposes of this section, any of the following actions
taken by or under the authority of the owner of a tribal fractional
interest in relation to any fractional share that is part of the total
fractional interest constitutes use of the entire fractional interest:
(1) Active operations regarding the surface or subsurface
of the real property, including leasing, production,
exploration, development, improvement, and maintenance.
(2) Recordation of an instrument in the electronic filing
system that creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences a claim
to or the continued existence of the fractional interest,
including an instrument that transfers or leases the interest.
Recordation of an instrument constitutes use of (i) any
recorded interest owned by any person in any fraction that is
the subject of the instrument, and (ii) any recorded fractional
interest in the property owned by any party to the instrument.
§ 5. Preservation of Tribal Fractional Interest by Notice
(A) An owner of a fractional interest may record at any time
notice of intent to preserve the fractional interest in the recordation
system maintained by the Department of the Interior. The
fractional interest is preserved upon publication. A tribal
fractional interest is not dormant if the notice is recorded within
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five years preceding the commencement of the action to terminate
the fractional interest or pursuant to Section 8 after
commencement of the action.
(B) Notice may be executed by the owner of a fractional interest
or by a third-party representative acting on behalf of the owner.
The notice may be executed by or on behalf of a co-owner for the
benefit of any or all co-owners in the parcel.
(C) The notice must contain the name of the owner of the
fractional interest or the co-owners or other persons for whom the
fractional interest is to be preserved or, if the identity of the owner
cannot be established or is uncertain, the name of the class of
which the owner is a member, and must identify the fractional
interest to be preserved by the following means:
(1) A reference to the location in the records of the
instrument that creates, reserves, or otherwise evidences the
interest, or of the judgment or administrative decree that
confirms the interest.
(2) A legal description of the fractional interest.
§ 6. Late Recording by Fractional Owners
(A) In this section, "litigation expenses" means costs and
expenses that the Administrative Law Judge determines are
reasonably and necessarily incurred in preparing for and
prosecuting an action, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(B) In an action to terminate a fractional interest pursuant to this
Act, the Administrative Law Judge shall permit the owner of the
fractional interest to record a late notice of intent to preserve the
fractional interest as a condition of dismissal of the action, upon
payment to the Department of the Interior for the benefit of the
other fractional owners of the real property the litigation expenses
attributable to the mineral interest or portion thereof as to which
the notice is recorded.
(C) This section does not apply in an action in which a
fractional interest has been unused within the meaning of Section
5(A) for a period of five or more years preceding the
commencement of the action.
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§ 7. Effect of Termination
An administrative order terminating a fractional interest, when
published, merges the terminated fractional interest with the
fractional interest of the co-owner(s), bringing the action in
proportion to their fractional ownership of the estate.
§ 8. Savings and Transitional Provisions
(A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, this Act
applies to all fractional interests, whether created before, on, or
after its effective date.
(B) This Act does not limit or affect any other procedure
provided by law for clearing abandoned fractional interests from
title to real property.
§ 9. Uniform Application and Construction
This Act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its purpose
of restoring viability to highly fractionated lands throughout all
states, territories, and districts of the United States containing
Indian lands.
§ 10. Severability
If any provision of this Act is unlawful or unenforceable, it shall
not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision
herein. To that end, the provisions of this Act are severable.
C. Sovereign Powers: Eminent Domain and Tribal Governments
Voluntary acquisition of fractionated lands is most certainly the preferred
outcome for resolving the Indian land fractionation problem. The likelihood
of complete voluntary compliance and acquisition, however, is relatively low.
It is estimated that seventy percent of fractionated lands could be acquired
voluntarily,222 leaving a significant portion of fractionated lands in the hands
of multiple holders. It is impossible to analyze which holders would be
willing to sell lands or continue in possession. Yet, it is important to consider
the forced taking of some interests to reduce the possibility of further
fractionation.
222. NCAI, COBELL SETTLEMENT, supra note 173, at 4.
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Eminent domain is defined as "[t]he inherent power of a governmental
entity to take privately owned property, [especially] land, and convert it to
public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking." 2 23
Governments have used eminent domain to promote the public welfare and
have recently expanded the definition to include even economic returns from
tax revenues as public benefits. 2 4 The tribes, as sovereign entities, should
exercise this power to provide a level of control over lands that would be the
highest since European expansion.
"By its terms, the Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes." 2 5 Thus,
the tribes, in their sovereign capacities, "are not restricted by constitutional
protections in the same way as states."226 This is not, however, without its
limitations. The Indian tribes are subject to the Indian Civil Rights Act.227
"Section 1302(5)(8) mirrors the language of the Fifth Amendment"
228protections, and provides in pertinent part, "No Indian tribe exercising
powers of self-government shall . . . take any private property for public use
without just compensation." 22 9 Despite this ability to wield power and take
land through a tribal takings clause, few tribes have taken advantage.230
Perhaps the Navajo Nation is the best example of a tribe that has exercised
such powers. In Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co.,2 31 private land was
taken for the use of a right of way.232 The Navajo Supreme Court held that
eminent domain "is an inherent power and authority which is essential to the
existence of all governments."233 But even those tribes that are exercising the
power are extremely cautious because of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions limiting the sovereign powers of tribes. 234 The powers that are
authorized are limited to lands owned by tribal citizens. 235 As a result, one
could logically conclude that fractionated lands of tribal members could be
223. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 601.
224. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 486-487 (2005).
225. Sawers, supra note 167, at 423.
226. Id.
227. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
228. Sawers, supra note 167, at 423.
229. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5).
230. Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on
Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 74 (2005).
231. 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (Navajo 1974).
232. Id. at 96.
233. Id. at 98.
234. Leeds, supra note 230, at 74.
235. Id.
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acquired by tribal authorities through eminent domain to solve the Indian land
tenure problem. But this ignores that much of the land interests may now be
outside tribal member control.236 To overcome this obstacle, the federal and
state governments could exercise eminent domain cooperatively with the
tribes to facilitate restoring the fractionated interests to productive use.
The public use definition has recently opened itself to incredibly broad
interpretations. In 1984, the Supreme Court, in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff 237 stated that the public purpose of combatting high real estate prices
could be served by reducing "concentrated property ownership." 238 The Court
stated that this taking was "rationally related" to a public purpose. 239 The
Midkiff decision invoked little anger and went largely undisputed or
challenged as an unconstitutional taking.240 The 2005 Supreme Court
decision of Kelo v. City of New London24' is a rather different story. Public
outrage enveloped the country as families were uprooted from their homes
when the city condemned property to make way for an economic
development initiative to free it from the burden of being a "distressed
municipality." The Court recognized that "public purpose" had been
defined broadly.24 3  Logically, reducing "fractionated heirship" could be
stretched to accommodate a public purpose because the perpetuation of
fractionated interests "leads to environmental degradation, poverty, and
unemployment." 244
Compensation (or a lack thereof) could present some problems. Just
compensation is an essential element to any takings claim.245 Compensation
typically involves the payment of money equal to the fair market value246 of
236. Whether the tribes would have jurisdiction over non-Indians in such a case is unsettled,
but would likely fall in favor of the non-Indians. See Veronica L. Bowen, The Extent of Indian
Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indians: South Dakota v. Bourland, 27 Creighton L. Rev. 605,
652 (1993-1994) (noting that the current law "condones a presumption against tribal sovereignty
over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land, which presumption can be overcome by demonstrating
a significant tribal interest or consent on the part of the non-Indians").
237. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
238. Id. at 245.
239. Id. at 241.
240. Leeds, supra note 230, at 56-57.
241. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
242. Id. at 473.
243. Id. at 480.
244. Sawers, supra note 167, at 423 (citing Shoemaker, supra note 38, at 752).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
246. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 1691 (defining fair market value as "[t]he
price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in
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the property to be condemned. 247  "Fair market value implies a willing,
informed buyer and a willing, informed seller." 24 8 The inherent problem with
eminent domain and the calculations of just compensation is that
"fractionated heirship interests may not be sold freely."2 49 Even if they could
be sold unencumbered, the calculation of these individual interests would be
virtually impossible. Appraisers often use three approaches to calculate the
value of other lands and property: comparable sales, cost, and income
capitalization. 2 50 The most widely used of these is the comparable sales
approach. 251' A limiting factor is that no appraiser would have sufficient data
or information to calculate the true value of these highly fractionated lands.252
Moreover, once a value is established, it is likely to be inaccurate.
[M]ore owners impose real costs and depress the value of the land.
Simply to divide the total value of the allotment by the shares held
by individual interest holders would actually over-compensate
them since the analysis ignores a significant determinant of value.
Interest-holders would receive significantly more than the
economic value of their interest. Adequate compensation should
reflect the diminution in value caused by the large number of
owners. 25 3
Furthermore, Indian land values have unique characteristics and often require
the consideration of special restrictions on use that can diminish the value that
an arm's-length transaction").
247. Sawers, supra note 167, at 423.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 320 (defining a comparable as "[a] piece
of property used as a comparison to determine the value of a similar piece of property"); id. at
399 (defining cost approach as "[a] method of appraising real property, based on the cost of
building a new structure with the same utility, assuming that an informed buyer would pay no
more for the property it would cost to build a new structure having the same usefulness"); id.
at 832 (defining income approach as "[a] method of appraising real property based on
capitalization of the income that the property is expected to generate").
251. Interview with Dr. Notie Lansford, Professor and Extension Economist, Okla. State
Univ. (Mar. 21, 2011) (stating that the comparable sales approach is the "preferred approach
by most appraisers because it is easily understood by appraisal readers and jurors in a
courtroom").
252. See Sawers, supra note 167, at 423 ("The more difficult part of the comparable sales
approach is not finding similar parcels in the local area; instead, the challenge is deciding
whether and how to adjust the value for the large number of owners.").
253. Id. at 423-24.
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a willing buyer would pay.254 These reductions in land values are difficult to
calculate, thus making it more difficult for tribal governments to determine
and secure enough funds to provide the just compensation required.
"Tribes [] do not have significant sources of capital."25s Like those of most
governmental entities, tribal budgets are limited, and the scarce resources that
do exist are already allocated to essential government operations such as
education, healthcare, and government services.256 As previously discussed,
"the federal government has shown itself unwilling to devote more than trivial
resources to land consolidation."257 In fact, the government has spent only a
fraction of the monies specifically designated - a little less than six million
of the more than eighty million dollars allocated to the BIA between 1934 and
1974.2 Of course, failure by Congress to appropriate adequate funding to
compensate fractional interest holders renders the program effectively useless.
But other possibilities exist for compensating fractional interests owners.
Several scholars have suggested a type of land swap with other tribal lands to
reduce fractional ownership.259 Under this type of scheme, each owner would
receive a piece of property elsewhere on the reservation or other tribal lands
in proportion to his current ownership fraction.2 60 Land, however, is the most
precious of resources. It is often regarded as the preeminent stake-hold of
one's achievements. 2 61 This conception of land can present great challenges
when dealing with fractional ownership. Indian lands are often sacred to the
ancestral descendants,262 who are now among the fractionated owners. Any
forced relocation, even if in proportion, would be considered a taking in the
most dramatic sense of the word.
254. See id. at 424.
255. Id.
256. E.g., Services, CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, available at http://choctawnation.c
om/services (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
257. Sawers, supra note 167, at 424.
258. Id. (citing BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON
PURCHASE OF INDIAN LAND AND ACRES OF INDIAN LAND IN TRUST: 1934-1975, at 4-5 (1976)).
259. E.g., Sawers, supra note 167, at 425; NCAI, COBELL SETTLEMENT, supra note 173, at
3.
260. NCAI, COBELL SETTLEMENT, supra note 173, at 3.
261. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit
Framework for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 889, 892 (2004) ("Property rights
are commonly regarded as a fundamental underpinning of a capitalist economic system.").
262. Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN.ENVTL. L.J. 313, 313
(2008).
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It is important to note that individual tribes could adopt the distribution
systems that they prefer. Tribal members are likely more willing to engage
in negotiations with tribal leaders than outside administrators or the federal
government. Tribes could ultimately even determine specific shares and
allocate them among the property owners of a given parcel, destroying the
classification of multiple interest holders as tenants in common, and creating
a free exchange among interest holders. Such a system would allow some
owners with larger interests to increase their shares by purchasing the smaller,
independently unusable shares, while giving other owners with smaller
interests the option to profit from their otherwise unproductive fractional
interests. Such a proposal vastly ameliorates the problem of continued land
fractionation and enhances the economic well-being of the interest holders by
giving them a parcel with the potential for economically productive use.
The Indian tribes traditionally have not been in positions for
entrepreneurial gain.263 Only recently, with the expansion of the Indian
gaming industry, have tribes been able to provide outreach services and other
newfound public service functions for tribal members." The development
of these capabilities opens a whole new world to help solve the fractionation
issue. Tribal governments could use their powers of eminent domain and
draw on these outside sources of revenue to generate monies for the
acquisition of highly fractionated lands. Essentially, the tribes hold dual hats
in this game, operating as the governmental power taking the land for a
greater public use, and serving as a bank for the individual owners to invest
their compensation into other land or financial ventures. These types of
activities would allow the tribes to rectify the land tenure problem by creating
a clearinghouse specifically for the constant acquisition of land to prevent
further fractionation. The monies from the initial deposits into an account
would accrue interest until enough is compounded either to increase the tribal
263. See Sawers, supra note 167, at 409 (noting that "[t]ribal funds are limited").
264. Gaming, NAT'L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, available at http://www.ncai.org/gaming
.43.0.html (last visited Apr. 25,2011) ("Like state and local governments, the revenues accruing
to tribal governments from any source are used as a tax base to fund essential services, such as
education, law enforcement, tribal courts, economic development, and infrastructure
improvement. In fact, Indian tribes are required by IGRA to use their gaming revenues for such
purposes. Much like the revenues from state lotteries, tribal governments also use gaming
revenues to fund social service programs, scholarships, health care clinics, new roads, new
sewer and water systems, adequate housing and chemical dependency treatment programs,
among others. Furthermore, many tribal governments are sharing their proceeds with local
non-Indian communities through philanthropic institutions providing funds to local schools,
clinics and social programs.").
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holdings or to purchase highly fractionated parcels. Once these lands are
consolidated, the tribes could then make further investment ventures to
provide activities and services such as education centers, business
development incubators within the tribal territories, or necessary health
facilities.
Individual tribal members also stand to gain from this type of investment
and development scheme. Tribal members could simply opt to take the
compensation, or they could invest in other projects that the tribes are
promoting in hopes of capitalizing on greater returns in the future. Plans
could be devised to minimize risk or even guarantee returns and prevent
default through investment contracts.265 The opportunity for tribal members
to profit from their interests, no matter how small, could help to alleviate
some of the economic hardships caused by the Indian land fractionation
problem.
VI. Conclusion
Indian land fractionation has plagued the United States for over one
hundred years. Despite attempts to reverse the failed policy of allotment,
fractionation continues. It is clear that Congress, acting alone, is unable to
solve the fractionation problem. The tribes should provide input and take
control of some aspects of reform.
The federal government has cleared the way for comprehensive reform
with the Cobell settlement. These initial steps still lack the substance to stop
current, let alone prevent future, fractionation. Though the settlement
provides $1.9 billion dollars for the consolidation of land interests, this
amount represents only a fraction of the total needed to rectify more than one
hundred years of failed Indian land policy. But full compensation to all IIM
account holders would bankrupt the government altogether.
Creating a Dormant Tribal Fractional Interests Act modeled after state
dormant mineral acts could offer a solution. Given the state of many highly
fractionated parcels, the forfeiture of land after inaction for a particular time
period allows the other interest holders an opportunity to make those lands
more economically productive.
Moreover, the governmental power of eminent domain could create a
wealth not seen in generations for tribes and tribal members. Though some
265. An investment contract is "an expectation of profits arising from a common enterprise"
that depends "solely" for its success on the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298 (1946).
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takings would likely be disputed, the contemplated compensation provides far
better relief than the current settlement plans. Some will be unhappy with a
forced taking. But the benefits to all interest holders and tribes could be
astronomical both in terms of short-term use and long-term economic
development and viability.
These proposed solutions still speak to the pervasive divide that has
plagued many Native American policies for decades. Power-sharing is
essential to the successful resolution of the land fractionation problem. Tribes
need to empower themselves and volunteer schemes to deal with fractionation
issues on their land, and the federal and state governments must be willing to
work cooperatively with the tribes.
Realizing that each distinct tribal government's needs will be different, it
is important that all nations work cooperatively to establish a workable
system for solutions to the land fractionation problem. For over one hundred
years, tribes and tribal governments have had their lands taken from them.
How fitting would it be to use the same takings doctrines to reconcile the
atrocities of land fractionation? After all, this land is your land, this land is
my land.
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